Inspired by the design patterns of object-oriented software architecture, we offer an initial set of "privacy patterns". Our intent is to describe the most important ways in which software systems can offer privacy to their stakeholders. We express our privacy patterns as class diagrams in the UML (Universal Modelling Language), because this is a commonlyused language for expressing the high-level architecture of an object-oriented system. In this initial set of privacy patterns, we sketch how each of Westin's four states of privacy can be implemented in a software system. In addition to Westin's states of Solitude, Intimacy, Anonymity, and Reserve, we develop a privacy pattern for an institutionalised form of Intimacy which we call Confidence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy requirements are problematic for any globallyaccessible computer system, because of significant differences in the conceptions of privacy by stakeholders with various legal traditions, cultures, religions, and individual desires. We do not attempt to survey these variations here. Instead, we elicit an initial set of "privacy patterns" from Westin's influential monograph [1] , in which he identified four primary "states" of privacy: Solitude, Intimacy, Anonymity, and Reserve.
In this article, we provide initial answers to the following questions.
• What architectural features of a software system will make it possible for its stakeholders to enjoy Westin's four states of privacy, whenever they are desirable and feasible? • Are there some "privacy patterns" which could be added to the "design patterns" of the Gamma et al. [2] , so that the architectural foundations for stakeholder privacy can be introduced at an early stage of system design? • Are there any obvious gaps in the coverage of our initial set of privacy patterns? We assume our reader has some prior knowledge of objectoriented design and the Universal Modelling Language (UML) [3] , [4] , [5] .
In Section 2, we present our initial set of privacy patterns as UML class diagrams. These patterns provide an adequate foundation for the privacy-aware management of personal identities.
In Section 3, we present subclasses of Entity, allowing us to distinguish between natural persons (who have privacy requirements) and other actors, such as computer systems, who do not have privacy requirements.
In Section 4, we present patterns for three contexts in which privacy requirements may arise for stakeholders.
• In the Isolated context, a stakeholder is in Solitude. • In the Secluded context, stakeholders are in Intimacy. An entity displays an aspect, whenever it enacts a role in a context. Contextualised roles may have powers to control and observe the activities of other participants in a context. Collectively, a context may be embodied as an entity which displays an aspect in order to enact a role in some higher-order context.
• In the Public Sphere, stakeholders may enjoy Anonymity, and are expected to fulfill the social contract of Reserve. In Section 5, we present a complicated context, which we call Trusting. Formally, the Trusting context may be considered an elaboration of the Secluded context defined in Section 4. However the Trusting context has so many additional elements, and is so commonly invoked in legal discussions of informational privacy, that we have defined Confidence as a fifth subclass of the PrivacyState. See Figure 1 .
II. FOUNDATIONS OF STRUCTURAL PRIVACY
In this section, we describe a class structure which supports a contextualised identity for every identifiable entity. The four classes of Figure 2 , and their four associations, embody our first four privacy patterns. We describe each of these patterns in turn below. These first four patterns are foundational: all of our other privacy patterns are elaborations, that is, subclasses, of classes and associations in Figure 2 .
Please note that all four of the classes in Figure 2 are abstract, as indicated by the italic font in their name. Concrete subclasses of these classes are defined in later sections of this article.
Privacy Pattern 1: Entity-aspect separation. Entities such as humans or computerised systems display one or more Aspects. The identifier for an Aspect does not immediately reveal the identity of the Entity who displays this aspect. Every Aspect must be displayed by an Entity; a system should not allow "orphan" Aspects.
The structural constraint against orphanage is indicated by the filled-in diamond on the "displays" association between an Entity and an Aspect in Figure 2 .
If an instance Alice of Entity is human, then Alice may display one set of characteristics and behaviours when she is at work, another set of characteristics and behaviours in her social life, and a third set of characteristics and behaviours in her family life. For analytic purposes, we may reify these three sets as "aspects of Alice". Alice may herself be such an analyst, and may be consciously separating her contact-lists and login identities into these three subsets.
This design pattern, if embodied in every computer system that is used by Alice, will ensure that the knowledge of any one of her work-login identities will not provide an immediate link to any of her extremely-private characteristics and behaviours (i.e. those which are not displayed in any of her aspects), nor to any of the characteristics or behaviours which Alice displays to her family and friends.
We consider this pattern to be a fundament of privacy-aware system design. We're not alone in this belief. Cameron's laws of identity refer to a "unidirectional identifier" [6] . The Jericho Forum's first identity commandment contains the requirement that "Core identifiers must only be connected to a persona via a one-way linkage (one-way trust)." [7] Please note that there are some terminological differences in our expression of this design pattern. Where we write "Entity", the commandment uses the phrase "core identifier". Where we write "Aspect", the commandment uses the word "persona".
We suggest that the word "persona" should be used only when referring to an Aspect of a subclass NaturalPerson of Entity, as will be defined in the next section. Our reasoning is that the privacy rights and expectations of a human (a.k.a. a natural person, in legal discourse) may be directly supported by this design pattern in its subcase of an entity-persona separation, and they may be indirectly supported by this design pattern in its general case of an entity-aspect separation. Using a different name for the Persona subclass of an Aspect would, we suggest, allow requirement analysts and systems architects to communicate more accurately and succinctly.
In Latin, persona is an actor's mask, connoting that it is worn by a human when playing a role in a play. A play would be represented as an instance of a Context in our class system. If an actor were a completely-computerised entity, we think it would be most appropriate to use an inhuman word such as "interface" rather than "persona" when speaking of its aspects.
Linguistically: all of the classes in our patterns are concrete nouns. The relations between classes are verbs. Interfaces are abstract nouns or occasionally adjectives. Our class diagrams thus define a specialised ontology for the discussion of privacy in complex systems.
Readers who are not familiar with the concept of a design pattern may imagine that it is a prescriptive form of architec-tural description i.e. specifying absolute requirements on its structural design. However a design pattern is not prescriptive, instead it is a trope or commonly-used design motif.
Design patterns capture solutions that have developed and evolved over time. Hence they aren't the designs people tend to generate initially. They reflect untold redesign and recoding as developers have struggled for greater reuse and flexibility in their software. Deisgn patterns capture these solutions in a succinct and easily applied form. [2] We now return to our discussion of Figure 2 , focussing on the association between an Aspect and a Role.
Privacy Pattern 2: Aspect-role separation. An Aspect is influential only when it is enacting a Role in some Context. The Role puts constraints and expectations on the range of activity of an Aspect. When an Entity (through an Aspect) is playing a Role, it may be able to observe and control the activities of other Role-enacting and Aspect-displaying Entities. Depending on the Context and the Role, it may be possible for a Role-enacting Aspect to be identified. Such identifications are crucially important when establishing accountabilities for this Aspect in other Contexts, e.g. in a judicial proceeding.
The aspect-role-separation pattern allows us to express the social and legal determinants of privacy, in a contextdependent way. In Section 4, we develop important subclasses of Context, for example Isolated, in which there are stereotyped Roles such as the Isolate and the Intruder. Each Role is played by an Aspect which implements the interface (e.g. Solitude) relevant to this role in this context. The interface defines the stereotypical behaviours (such as introspect()) which are socially or legally expected of any Aspect enacting this particular subclass of Role.
In a UML class diagram, an arc indicates that an instance of a class is able to access the data and methods of another instance. We use labels to indicate the type of access. In particular, an arc labelled "controls" indicates that a method could be invoked, or a data field could be written. An arc labelled "observes" indicates that a data field could be read. This is informal semantics. To formalise these semantics, we could subtype an association class. However we see very little benefit in expressing this subtyping formally, especially since typed associations are rarely seen in UML class diagrams for software systems.
Privacy Pattern 3: Role-context separation. Every Role is participating in a Context. Orphaned Role objects should be garbage-collected, because a role is ineffectual if it is not associated with any context.
The reader may find it helpful to think of the list of Roles in a Context as being analogous to the Dramatis Personae of a play. One of the tasks of the director of a play is to ensure that, whenever it is performed, all of its currently-active roles are being enacted by some actor. It is possible for the same actor to play multiple roles in the same play, perhaps even simultaneously. However our first design pattern suggests that a privacy-aware system will prevent any entity from playing a role in any context as itself; instead, every entity is required to put on some mask (an Aspect) whenever they are on stage. This mask will prevent them from revealing information (such as the actual colour of their skin) which would inappropriate in the context of this play. The aspect of each actor must of course conform to the role they are playing. It should not be possible for anything to happen on the stage, unless it is being performed by some Role defined in this play.
Privacy Pattern 4: Context-entity separation. Every Context is the embodiment of some Entity. Some Entities embody a Context.
The "embodies" association closes the loop of our foundational privacy patterns, by allowing conglomerates or corporations (as structured within a Context) to behave as entities in some higher-level context. For example, a corporation may have many employees and a complex decision-making apparatus. However from a legal perspective, a corporation is answerable to a judicial authority in the context of a legal proceedings.
III. TYPES OF ENTITY
We move now to Figure 3 , which defines five subtypes of Entity. This proliferation of entity types may seem unfortunate, however we cannot see how our privacy patterns could have fewer abstract classes inheriting from Entity, while still distinguishing privacy requirements from other types of requirements. In Figure 3 , the most general class (Actor) is drawn at the top, and the most specific classes are at the bottom. Please recall that in the UML, an open-ended triangle indicates the direction of the inheritance relation between two classes.
An Actor is a specialised form of Entity: an actor may surveil or compel other entities, whereas any class which inherits directly from an Entity can neither suveil nor compel.
A document is an example of an entity which is not able to surveil or compel. A computer is an example of an entity that is able to surveil or compel. We have introduced surveillance and compulsion into our patterns to indicate • how a privacy requirement could be breached, by any actor who uses surveillance or compulsion to subvert the one-way entity-aspect relation, and also • how a privacy requirement could be enforced, by any actor which is trusted to use its surveillances and compulsions only to detect privacy breaches, and to respond appropriately to any detected (or alleged) breaches. We use callouts to express requirements, as in the SysML profile [8] of UML [3] . Callouts are linked to a class, or to another callout, by a dashed line. We use five stereotypes in our annotations: «requirement», «forbiddance», «allowance», «obligation», and «exemption».
A «requirement» is a correctness constraint, i.e. a property of a system which could be formally verified. For example, the anti-slavery requirement at the bottom of Figure 3 is, formally, a constraint on the "owns" relation of every instance of NaturalPerson.
We use our other four stereotypes as a rough classifier of privacy requirements. A requirement that curtails the range of acceptable actions by an actor is a «forbiddance»; and its text field must specify which action(s) SHALL NOT be performed by this actor. A forbiddance may be derogated by an attached «allowance» which specifies some action(s) which MAY be performed. Alternatively, a privacy requirement may be expressed as an allowance which is derogated by one or more forbiddances.
Another common features we have observed, when reviewing the privacy-structures of existing systems for this article, is that a privacy requirement curtails the range of inactions by an actor. We use the «obligations» stereotype on such requirements, and the accompanying text field must specify which action(s) SHALL be performed. Derogations on obligations are called «exemptions», and these specify actions which MAY NOT be performed.
For logical completeness, we will allow a privacy requirement to be expressed as an exemption which is derogated by some obligation(s), although to date we have not elicited any requirement that would be naturally expressed in this format. Figure 3 exhibits a privacy pattern of a judicial authority with a governance relation over the entities it recognises as legal persons. A privacy-sensitive judical authority will prohibit surveillance and compulsion, except in cases where these powers are necessary to its dispensation of justice.
Privacy Pattern 5: Surveillance and compulsion are forbidden. Actors are generally forbidden from surveilling and compelling other entities, however there is an important exception to this forbiddance. A judicial authority may allow some surveillance and compulsion. Figure 3 contains a second privacy pattern: the concept of legal ownership, with a structural restriction against slavery. We note, in passing, that it may be possible to develop design patterns for all generally-accepted human rights.
Privacy Pattern 6: Entities are owned. Any legal person may own any entity, unless the second entity is another natural person. The legal ownership of an entity implies a legallyenforceable right to compel, surveil, control and observe that entity. Every entity has an owner.
We note that the "owns" relation of Figure 3 is 1-way navigable. This models the possibility that an entity, such as a document, does not carry a record of its current owner. In particular systems, it might be appropriate to specify a navigation from an entity to its owner as an «allowance», or as a «forbiddance», if obtaining information about the ownership of this entity is privacy-sensitive.
We note that different stakeholders will, in general, have different privacy requirements. During the privacy-requirements elicitation for a system, these differences could be recorded in stakeholder-specific callouts on a class diagram for this system.
We also note that our privacy patterns will support many theologies. In particular, an atheist may define a LegalPerson that has null (or randomly-generated) method bodies; this entity could serve as the owner of all entities that are not subject to any other judicial authority. By contrast, a monotheist may construct a class hierarchy in which God is a LegalPerson which governs itself, and which has a JudicialAuthority over all other JudicialAuthorities. Because privacy patterns are suggestive rather than prescriptive, the architects of a system may develop a class hierarchy in which some entities do not have explicitly-represented owners.
Finally, we note that artificial persons such as corporations may make claims to privacy requirements [9] , as may informally-constituted groups such as clusters of friends, participants in religious ceremonies, and extended families. In such cases, the class analyst should construct an entity to embody the claimant's group, then attempt to map their groupprivacy claims onto the privacy patterns of the next section. If this is infeasible, we hope the analyst will contact us with a description of the group's unrepresentable privacy claim, or with any new privacy pattern they devise for its representation.
IV. STATES OF PRIVACY
We move now to Figure 1 . The five interfaces in this figure define five distinct states or modalities of privacy. Four of these states were identified by Westin in his 1967 survey of privacy, as understood by contemporary "anthropologists, psychologists, biologists, physicists, historians, and psychiatrists, as well as philosophers, lawyers, and laymen" [1] . Westin argues that the states of solitude, intimacy, reserve, and anonymity are recognised and protected in a wide range of cultures.
In our reductionist treatment of Westin's conception of privacy, we assert that any state of privacy may be claimed by any person, or by any group of people, in any context. We consider it the job of the requirements analyst to discover the particular forms of privacy that are likely to be claimed by stakeholders, and to determine which of these privacy claims can be accepted or rejected automatically. We consider it the job of the systems implementer to provide affordances which, ideally, will make it easy (or even automatic) for users • to make and withdraw claims to privacy, • to enquire into the status of their outstanding claims, Fig. 4 . Privacy Pattern 7: Solitude. An entity with an aspect playing the Isolate role is able to introspect, but is unable to control or observe any other entity. Generally, other entities are forbidden from intruding on an isolate. Urgent intrusions may be allowed by the governor of the isolate, or by the societies to which the isolate belongs.
• to resolve problematic claims as fairly and quickly as possible, with recourse to appropriate external parties for the most problematic claims, and • to effectively defend privacy claims, almost always without recourse to external enforcement agents, but sometimes by engaging other users of the system who have a vested interest in this claim or this type of claim.
A. Solitude Figure 4 is a design pattern for a context which realises the Solitude state of privacy. We elicited this pattern from the following passage in Westin's monograph [1] :
The first state of privacy is solitude; here the individual is separated from the group and freed from the observation of other persons. He may be subjected to jarring physical stimuli, such as noise, odors, and vibrations. His peace of mind may continue to be disturbed by physical sensations of heat, cold, itching, and pain. He may believe that he is being observed by God or some supernatural force, or fear that some authority is secretly watching him. Finally, in solitude he will be especially subject to that familiar dialogue with the mind or conscience. But, despite all these physical or psychological intrusions, solitude is the most complete state of privacy that individuals can achieve. The Isolated context in Figure 4 is embodied in a class of entity which we have named Isolation. This embodiment allows an aspect of an instance of Isolation to be persistently identifiable while it is playing a role in a surrounding context. For example, if the surrounding context were in an airport, it could have a guarantor of solitude who responds to claim-Solitude() calls from nearby isolates, by offering them a rental contract for a currently-vacant sleeping pod.
B. Intimacy
We elicit the Secluded context of Figure 5 from the following passage in Westin [1] :
In the second state of privacy, intimacy, the individual is acting as part of a small unit that claims and is allowed to exercise corporate seclusion so that it may achieve a close, relaxed, and frank relationship between two or more individuals. Typical units of intimacy are husband and wife, the family, a friendship circle, or a work clique. Whether close contact brings relaxed relations or abrasive hostility depends on the personal interaction of the members, but without intimacy a basic need of human contact would not be met. We derive two privacy requirements on intimates: they must not join an existing intimate group without an invitation, and they must not reveal anything about the intimacy to any outside party. We add a structural requirement, that the Secret role must be filled by an aspect of an entity that is owned by one of the intimates.
Westin's passage suggests that an additional requirement may be commonly elicited: that there be some upper limit on the size of an intimate group. This would limit the risk that claims to seclusion are used to promote a political cause or to serve a commercial purpose, rather than for a "close, relaxed, and frank relationship" between a few individuals. Figure 6 is our most complex schema. In it, we have modelled the states of Reserve and Anonymity in a context (PublicSphere) which is embodied as a Society. There are three types of actor in our PublicSphere: PublicFigures (who have names which could be replicated in other PublicSphers), anonymous roles (each of which is aliased to exactly one public figure) , and instances of PublicProperty (which model newspapers, advertisements, and any other identifiable entities which are displaying observable and controllable aspects in the commons of this society).
C. Anonymity and Reserve
The privacy requirements in this schema are restrictions on the behaviour of public figures. They are expected, by their society, to regulate their own behaviour -and that of any anonymous aliases they may be using. We elicited the state of Anonymity from the following passage in Westin's monograph [1] .
The third state of privacy, anonymity, occurs when the individual is in public places or performing public acts but still seeks, and finds, freedom from identification and surveillance. He may be riding a subway, attending a ball game, or walking the streets; he is among people and knows that he is being observed; but unless he is a well-known celebrity, he does not expect to be personally identified and held to the full rules of behavior and role that would operate if he were known to those observing him. In this state the individual is able to merge into the "situational landscape." Knowledge or fear that one is under systematic observation in public places destroys the sense of relaxation and freedom that men seek in open spaces and public arenas. Still another kind of anonymity is the publication of ideas anonymously. Here the individual wants to present some idea publicly to the community or to a segment of it, but does not want to be universally identified at once as the author-especially not by the authorities, who may be forced to take action if they "know" the perpetrator. The core of each of these types of anonymous action is the desire of individuals for times of "public privacy." We elicited the state of Reserve from the following passage.
Reserve, the fourth and most subtle state of privacy, is the creation of a psychological barrier against unwanted intrusion; this occurs when the individual's need to limit communication about himself is protected by the willing discretion of those surrounding him. Most of our lives are spent not in solitude or anonymity but in situations of intimacy and in group settings where we are known to others. Even in the most intimate relations, communication of self to others is always incomplete and is based on the need to hold back some parts of one's self as either too personal and sacred or too shameful and profane to express. This circumstance gives rise to what Simmel called "reciprocal reserve and indifference," the relation that creates "mental distance" to protect the personality. This creation of mental distance -a variant of the concept of "social distance" -takes place in every sort of relationship under rules of social etiquette; it expresses the individual's choice to withhold or disclose information -the choice that is the dynamic aspect of privacy in daily interpersonal relations. Simmel identified this tension within the individual as being between "self-revelation and self-restraint" and, within society, between "trespass and discretion." The manner in which individuals claim reserve and the extent to which it is respected or disregarded by others is at the heart of securing meaningful privacy in the crowded, organizationdominated settings of modern industrial society and urban life, and varies considerably from culture to culture [1] .
The boundaries of a reserve may be changed, from time to time, by the active members of that society. This implies that elicitations of a reserve should be revalidated, and possibly revised, as the society evolves.
As with most other types of privacy requirements, we do not expect the requirements associated with reserves to be enforced accurately by a computerised system. However, it would be feasible to design a system in which a computerised actor is a PublicFigure in a society, and to advertise (via a release to PublicProperty) the availability of its isOffensive() method. If the members of the society come to a general agreement that this method has few false-positives, then it could be reliably used as a detector of some forms of offensive behaviour in that society. If it is feasible to develop a sociallyacceptable automated response mechanism for automaticallydetected violations, then the social reserve is being technically enforced. However in any case where the automated responses are socially inappropriate, we would say that the social reserve is being violated by this computerised system -and we would expect a corrective response via social, legal, or economic pressure on the owner of the system.
The governmental role in the public sphere is played by a JudicialAuthority, as originally defined in Figure 3 and as referenced in the bottom callout of Figure 6 .
The two forbiddances in Figure 6 are illustrative but not prescriptive. The first is a general statement of reserve, framed in a manner that suggests a common-law approach to its definition whereby the isOffensive() method of a normative public figure such as a judge or kaumatua (a revered elder, in Maori) is used to determine whether or not a sanction is appropriate. The second is supportive of anonymity, in the sense that actors are forbidden from assisting each other in piercing the veil of anonymity. The allowance in this figure is intended to suggest the social conventions which distinguish an unoffensive publication from an actionable breach of a generally-acknowledged reserve.
We have not specified, in this figure, whether the anonymity is linkable, that is, whether the binding of an aspect to an Anon instance is persistent (so that an Anon instance has a pseudonym that is linked to a reputational history), or (in an extreme form of unlinkability) each Anon instance acts at most once and its enacting entity is careful not to disclose any information about their prior anonymous actions. The implementation of the authenticateAnonym() method would greatly affect linkability, for example if it always returns false then the Anon instances would be offering no assistance to anyone who is attempting to determine their identity. At the other extreme, an authenticateAnonym() call might return a cryptographically-sound proof of a claim to an identity that is specified, in the parameters of the authenticalAnonym() call, as an instance of an Anon in a PublicSphere.
V. CONFIDENCE
We have added "confidence" to Westin's list of states. This fifth state allows our schemas to directly represent a conception of privacy which has been adopted by many technologists and policy analysts. In this conception of privacy, sometimes called "information privacy" [10] , an individual's control over the confidentiality of their personal information is considered to be the primary (or even the only) meaning of the word "privacy".
We elicited the Confidence state of privacy from the EU's Data Protection Directive. Figure 8 is our reductionist interpretation of this complex directive. Each member state of the EU will comply with this directive in its own way; but generally speaking, each member state is obligated to impose a duty of care (i.e. a set of obligations) on every controller of personal data who falls within their jurisidction. The legal situation of a controller is thus roughly comparable to that of a trustee, in a trust which holds the personally-identifiable information of the data subjects as its asset.
We note that our schema for Confidence models an informal trust, not a legal trust. A legal trust is a specialisation of our privacy pattern for Confidence such that the trust is a LegalActor, and not merely a SentientActor. Generally, a JudicialAuthority requires all Trustees of its legally-registered trusts to be LegalActors within its jurisdiction.
A. Corporation
In Figure 8 we depict a corporation as an identifiable entity in our class hierarchy. We do not elicit any privacy requirements from this depiction, however we include this diagram in our article because corporations are often cast as antagonists or protagonists in contemporary discourse about privacy.
VI. DISCUSSION
The dozens of classes and relations defined in this article are sufficient to support our initial set of privacy patterns. We elicited these privacy patterns by analysing texts, such as Westin's monograph [1] , that describe various conceptions of privacy. Because human culture is diverse, and because the word "privacy" is a social construct, our design patterns are subject to change over time. It is possible that new conceptions of privacy will arise in the future, it is possible that some states of privacy are not representable in our current ontology, and it is possible that a simpler set of design patterns would have similar coverage. However Westin's taxonomy of privacy states [1] has been widely accepted as foundational in the English-speaking world, and we have elicited our design patterns from this source, so they have at least surface validity.
We tested the coverage of Westin's four states by eliciting the "informational privacy" requirements detailed in the EU's Data Protection Directive [11] . We discovered that informational privacy can be represented as a subclass of Intimacy; although we have presented it here as a fifth state. The subclassing can be understood as introducing, into a Secluded context, a trustee who has a duty of care toward the people who reveal secrets.
Below, we sketch how the coverage of our ontology could be tested by a eliciting privacy requirements on the relationship of a parent with a child, and with their spouse. Whenever domestic secrets are being exchanged, family members are in a Secluded context. If these exchanges occur in a public place, the parent may be expected (by their society) to claim a private reserve for this seclusion. If these exchanges occur at home, then members of the public may be expected (by their society) to refrain from eavesdropping. By this line of reasoning, we claim Intimacy whenever we enter our own house; and we accept as an Intimate anyone we admit into our house. We note that Facebook and other social networking systems provide ways for family members to construct a "virtual home" as a secret group.
Our intent in this article is not to describe any new privacyenhancing technologies or affordances, but instead to propose conceptual foundations for the elicitation, analysis and implementation of a full range of privacy requirements.
In future, we will review a broader range of sources, including the Quran [12] and the constitutional law of the United States [13] , to cross-validate our ontology of privacy and perhaps to discover additional design patterns.
We are currently in the process of extending the UML use-case diagram so that it is expressive of what we call "privacy cases". These cases will portray privacy requirements diagrammatically, calling out the relevant context (e.g. Intimacy), indicating an action (e.g. the revelation of a secret to an intimate) and at least one impermissible or required reaction (e.g. the relevation of someone else's intimate secret to a third party). We invite the reader to correspond with us if they wish to join in this research programme.
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